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Cloudflare Develops Public Certificate Authority for Post-Quantum Web Security

Collected Nov 9, 2026

Cloudflare has reported results from a Chrome experiment testing Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) as a replacement for conventional certificate chains, measuring roughly 9% faster median performance. The trial, run with Google's Chrome team, served billions of MTCs to 50% of Chrome Beta 146 for selected domains on Cloudflare's free plan, and Cloudflare wound it down in August 2026. The company is now developing a public certificate authority (CA) that issues MTCs, with a target of inclusion in Chrome's quantum-resistant Root Store in early 2027, subject to evaluation.

The experiment used classical signatures, not post-quantum ones, and Cloudflare attributed most of the speedup to eliminating intermediate certificates rather than to the tree structure itself. That distinction matters: it shows the bandwidth savings can arrive before the post-quantum migration, but it leaves the harder post-quantum case unproven at this scale.

The motivation is size. Post-quantum signatures are roughly 40 times larger than classical ones, according to Cloudflare, which strains the Web Public Key Infrastructure against the bandwidth and storage limits of the TLS handshake and the servers that serve it. A certificate chain with several post-quantum signatures would be correspondingly heavy.

MTCs restructure the trust model. Rather than having a CA sign each certificate individually, the CA records certificate data in an append-only Merkle tree and signs a checkpoint, the current root of that tree. A Merkle tree is a hash structure where each leaf is hashed and combined pairwise up the tree, so any change to the contents changes the root; a client can then be given a small set of sibling hashes, an inclusion proof, showing that its certificate sits under the signed root. Verification therefore means checking a compact proof against a signed tree head instead of transmitting a full chain.

Cloudflare combines issuance with transparency logging. Ownership validation runs through the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol, the same automated flow used for widely deployed certificates today. An independent mirroring cosigner verifies and stores updated tree states, which helps detect inconsistent views of the log between parties and preserves issuance records if the original log becomes unavailable.

A second mechanism, landmark-relative certificates, trims the handshake further. Cloudflare distributes authenticated landmarks, snapshots of tree state, to clients in advance. A server can then prove its certificate's position relative to a known landmark rather than from the root. In the common case the handshake carries one public key, one signature and an inclusion proof smaller than 1 KB, and the server still proves possession of its private key. The catch is that clients may be newly installed, offline, or missing a landmark update, so servers must keep a standalone MTC certificate as a fallback. In practice that means running two issuance paths and carrying the heavier artifact until landmark coverage is near-universal.

Questions about operations remain. Alicja Tendaj, a Tier 2 technical support specialist at SSL.com, raised revocation and incident handling in a LinkedIn response to the announcement, noting that with short validity and trust anchored in a tree head, much of the conventional OCSP and CRL playbook becomes a matter of how quickly a certificate can be stopped from being included. That is a fair reading of the design: revocation shifts from publishing signed status responses to controlling what enters the next checkpoint, so the useful metric becomes the interval between a decision and the next signed tree head reaching clients, plus how quickly cosigners and mirrors converge.

Cloudflare names three remaining requirements for broader deployment: independent monitoring at production volume, a diverse ecosystem of CAs and cosigners, and browser support. The public CA plan addresses the supply side, but a single-vendor tree with a single cosigner arrangement would concentrate risk; the call for diversity is effectively a request for the transparency guarantees to hold even when participants do not trust each other.

Matthew Prince, Cloudflare's CEO, framed the transition in a press release as a coordination problem, describing the upgrade of the web's security before quantum computers can break it as one of the biggest coordination challenges in the history of the Internet. The remark is apt given how Web PKI depends on browsers, CAs and operators moving together.

For readers outside the certificate world, a quick orientation helps. Today a browser ships with a store of trusted root authorities, each root signs intermediates, and intermediates sign leaf certificates for sites. Every handshake normally ships that chain, so larger post-quantum signatures multiply across every connection. MTCs move most of that data out of the handshake and into a log the client can check cheaply, trading per-connection bulk for shared, verifiable state. The widely known alternative, the larger signature schemes themselves being standardized for post-quantum use, reduces risk over time but does not shrink signatures. Cloudflare's bet is that restructuring issuance is cheaper than shipping bigger chains everywhere.

The open questions this suggests are about trust concentration and rollout. A certificate tree whose checkpoints must reach clients quickly puts pressure on update distribution, cache lifetimes and the fallback path, and the design's reliance on pre-distributed landmarks creates a bootstrapping problem for new or isolated clients. Independent monitoring at production volume is the stated gate, and it is the right one: transparency only helps if enough parties actually watch the log.

Why it matters: Any team terminating TLS at scale will eventually absorb post-quantum signature sizes, and the MTC work is a concrete proposal for keeping handshakes small rather than waiting for faster networks. Developers on Cloudflare's free plan were already inside the experiment's blast radius, so the practical question for operators is whether their clients support MTC verification and their stacks can handle a fallback certificate alongside landmark-relative issuance. If the public CA clears Chrome's quantum-resistant Root Store in early 2027 as targeted, expect certificate management tooling and revocation workflows to need revisiting; if evaluation slips, plan for larger chains in the interim. That timing is a stated target, not a commitment, and the ecosystem prerequisites Cloudflare lists are the likely determinants of whether it holds.

Read at InfoQ · AI, ML & Data Engineering

Based on reporting from the original publisher. Visit the source for full context and later updates.

Publisher excerpt

Cloudflare is developing a public certificate authority for Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) to reduce the bandwidth overhead of post-quantum cryptography. A Chrome experiment served billions of MTCs to 50% of Chrome Beta 146 for selected domains, reporting 9% faster median performance. Wider deployment depends on browser support, transparency, and production-scale validation. By Leela Kumili