The hidden supply chain costs of the AI boom

Harvard Business School economist Willy Shih joined The Verge's Decoder podcast to discuss his forthcoming book, Where Does My Stuff Come From? The Powerful Economics Behind Global Supply Chains, in a conversation that ranged across tariffs, reshoring, flat-panel TVs, rare jet-engine alloys and the computing infrastructure buildout around AI. The interview was published as part of the Decoder series and has been lightly edited for length and clarity. It marks Shih's third appearance on the show, after earlier conversations during The Verge's coverage of Foxconn's Wisconsin LCD project and the pandemic-era chip shortage.
Shih's central argument is that supply chains are organized by economics first and policy second, and that trade barriers rarely produce the industrial outcomes governments intend. He illustrated this with the Foxconn episode: when residents of the Wisconsin community sent him the building plans from zoning hearings and asked whether the site would become a panel factory, he concluded it would not, because a genuine flat-panel plant requires enormous amounts of structural steel and concrete for stability, and the plans called for too little of both. The wider LCD industry, he noted, sits in China largely because heavy subsidies and industrial policy encouraged those plants to locate there.
The tariff era, in his account, has produced workarounds rather than repatriation. Firms facing duties on Chinese goods move assembly to Vietnam or Mexico, or otherwise route around the barrier. He pointed to record US imports from Ireland in the first quarter of 2025, ahead of the April 2 tariff announcements, followed by slow imports from Ireland in the first half of 2026 as that stockpile was drawn down. He also cited holiday-season TV advertisements for sets sourced from Mexico, even though the flat-panel factories feeding those sets are in China, and noted new direct ocean container services from China to Mexico established over the past two years. In his reading, those routes carry parts and components into Mexico so finished goods can enter the US under USMCA preferences.
That dynamic puts the policy goal of rebuilding American manufacturing in tension with the trade architecture the US itself set up. Shih described the aim of building the iPhone in the United States as the administration's stated objective, and said he has never regarded it as achievable. His reasoning is that the US is a high-cost country, so manufacturing that returns must justify high labor costs through high labor productivity, heavy automation or products nobody else can make. He offered the example of high-temperature superalloys for the hot section of jet engines: only three companies worldwide know how to cast them, two in the US and one in the UK. Jet engines, he added, are an area where the US, France and the UK supply the global market, including China.
On the macro picture, Shih argued that two adjustment mechanisms failed over the past two decades. The first is domestic: the shift of work to China left communities behind, and the country did not build a serious retraining response for workers who had made furniture in North Carolina or castings and forgings in Kentucky. The second is external: despite a large US trade deficit, exchange rates have not moved meaningfully since the 1980s, which was also the last time the US ran a trade surplus, when the dollar fell sharply against the yen. He characterized China as running a very large surplus, being content with an imbalance in which the world depends on its output while it buys little in return, and noted that Europe, particularly Germany's auto-centered economy, has come to see this as an existential problem.
Rather than a full retreat from trade, Shih favors a bloc-based approach — deepening ties with North American, European, Japanese, Southeast Asian, Australian, New Zealand, Central and South American and African partners — arguing that such a group would cover most needs for critical minerals, low-cost labor and technology specialties. He is explicitly pro-USMCA as NAFTA's successor, on the grounds that some goods genuinely require access to inexpensive labor that Mexico can supply, alongside what the US sources from Canada. He also recalled the original security rationale for globalization: interlocking economies raise the price of conflict, and cheap goods are part of what keeps the public invested in peace. Tariffs on steel, he suggested, show the limits of piecemeal protection — once input costs rise, fabricators simply import finished construction equipment instead, and when duties expand to cover steel content and then nearly everything, domestic prices climb. The low-inflation stretch from roughly 2000 to 2012 or 2014, he noted, owed something to inexpensive Chinese goods.
The interview also touched on AI's infrastructure demands. The framing notes an unprecedented buildout consuming the planet's computing resources, and the conversation references the current squeeze on memory, discussed under the label RAMageddon, as part of the same supply-chain story. Shih's method applies directly: memory fabs, advanced packaging and server assembly each depend on capital-intensive plants, specialized inputs and long lead times, so a demand surge collides with capacity that cannot be added quickly. A likely trade-off, on his logic, is that component prices and allocation priorities shift toward whoever can pay and plan furthest ahead, with knock-on effects for device makers and cloud operators. He also mentioned Apple sourcing titanium from Pennsylvania-based Perryman for the iPhone 18 Pro, an example of a narrow, differentiated input that can plausibly be sourced domestically.
Why it matters: hardware teams planning 2026 and 2027 supply should assume tariffs change routing, costs and lead times rather than the underlying geography of production, and should model Mexico and Southeast Asia as assembly layers over Asian components. Because capacity in memory, panels and specialized materials cannot be conjured quickly, procurement and product managers may need longer contracts and dual sourcing. This is inference from Shih's reasoning, but it follows directly from his point that markets route around barriers rather than dismantle them.
Based on reporting from the original publisher. Visit the source for full context and later updates.
Publisher excerpt
Today, I’m talking with Willy Shih, an economist, a professor of management practice at Harvard Business School, and the author of the upcoming book, Where Does My Stuff Come From? The Powerful Economics Behind Global Supply Chains. Willy is one of my all-time favorite Decoder guests — his way of looking at the world through […]