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Grok Build coding agent leaks oodles of confidential info, some belonging to SpaceXSI

Collected Nov 10, 2026

Security firm Claroc reported this week that Grok Build, the app-building agent from SpaceXSI (the merged SpaceX and xAI), has been exposing data from thousands of user-created apps through its sharing links. The findings cover apps belonging to numerous organizations, including two dozen built by SpaceXSI itself. Claroc said it notified SpaceXSI of the exposure on Sunday; when no response came, a Claroc official tagged Elon Musk and Grok manager Matt Palmer on X. By the time Ars Technica published its report, links for all 24 SpaceXSI apps returned an "app not found" error. SpaceXSI began pulling the links within a few hours of Ars sending questions, according to the article.

Grok Build is designed to let a user describe an app in speech or text and get a working version within minutes, then share it with others via a URL. The links use randomly generated phrases, sometimes called dice words, such as "cinder-crane-sand-frost," which users can edit, followed by grok.me. The intent is that only someone who knows the exact link can reach the app. The weakness is placement: the random portion sits to the left of the domain rather than in a path after it. Passive DNS services, which log lookups of previously unseen hostnames into publicly searchable databases, can therefore enumerate every grok.me subdomain that has been resolved. Links structured like Google Docs or Claude artifact URLs, where the secret string is in the path, never appear in those logs.

Claroc CTO Asaf Aprozper said a passive DNS search surfaced 43,601 links ending in grok.me; more than 35,000 of them, nearly 95 percent, opened the corresponding app and all its stored data when clicked. Aprozper said tests over the past week showed Grok defaults links to "Anyone with the link," with users able to switch to "invited users" or "only you." A representative for Cursor, the AI coding service SpaceXSI recently acquired, said Grok Build apps are private by default and nothing becomes public unless the creator chooses to share it, adding that competing agents from ChatGPT, Lovable and Bolt also generate shareable links. Aprozper's testing contradicts the privacy-by-default description, and the representative did not answer follow-up questions, including whether SpaceXSI plans to notify affected customers.

Claroc's sampling of the exposed material spans business plans, ad proposals, medical exam results, cruise-line galley checklists, and employee names and ID numbers. Among the examples it cited: a Peruvian construction company's occupational-health dashboard covering 3,784 worker medical exams; a Tesla service-center scorecard naming 22 technicians with productivity and bonus status; a US Navy logistics contractor's roster of 108 people; a hospital staff app listing roughly 3,565 employees; a home builder's sales callsheet with about 583 prospects plus budgets and financing notes; a Malaysian holding company's tracker for 37 property developments with profit and sales figures; an auto transport firm's quote desk holding about 4,000 orders with prices and margins; and a Norwegian-Finnish aerospace and defense group's load board for an explosives building at a US plant, along with its safety training matrix. In the SpaceXSI-built apps, Claroc reported a confidential onboarding plan for a new enterprise sales hire, a sales territory map covering 594 accounts, internal system addresses for sales tools, and advertising proposals. Aprozper said the cruise company's CISO pulled in the full security team once told and was working to contain the exposure.

The pattern is worth understanding because it is a privacy problem created by deployment convenience, not by a prompt injection or a model flaw. Capability-based access control, the model Google has used for years with long unguessable document URLs, relies entirely on the secret being unguessable and unreachable through discovery mechanisms. Moving the secret into a DNS name breaks the second assumption whenever a third party is resolving those names. In practice, the same enumeration risk applies to any link-sharing feature that puts randomness in a subdomain. Aprozper said Lovable, Bolt and Replit assign each app its own web address, so the same DNS records expose them too, though he found the most sensitive company data on Grok. Claude's public artifacts, ChatGPT's shared conversations and Gemini's share links use path-based secrets, per the report.

The timeline also illustrates how disclosure can stall. A Sunday notice went unanswered, escalation on X followed, and the provider's own apps stayed exposed on Monday evening before being taken down after press inquiries. Claroc says it is still notifying affected companies.

Why it matters: Any team using Grok Build links, or comparable builders that give each app a public hostname, should assume shared URLs may be discoverable and switch projects to invited-users-only by default. Developers building sharing features should keep secret tokens in URL paths or fragments rather than subdomains, since subdomains leak into DNS logs. For product teams, the episode is a reminder that AI-generated internal tools can bypass the sign-in controls of a normal SaaS purchase, and that link defaults deserve the same review as permissions. Whether SpaceXSI changes default settings or notifies affected customers remains an open question, based on the company's silence in the report.

Read at Ars Technica · AI

Based on reporting from the original publisher. Visit the source for full context and later updates.

Publisher excerpt

Researcher finds 35,000 Grok Build apps wide open to anyone who looked for them.